The above comments reflect three varied aspects of Gandhi's philosophy.
Consider his support of a caste system and his opposition to allowing the "untouchables" to have separate elections. There is also his insistence that all religious beliefs which conflict with the dictates of reason be rejected, and his indictment of modern civilization for eschewing religion. We should include as well his belief in the presence of Truth that all should accept in a genuine realist sense even though it can only be understood in light of one's own individual situation as among these varied aspects. Such seemingly antithetical beliefs result from the fact that essential to Gandhian thought is both the notion that we have an independent (seemingly atomistic) self, separate from our particular aims and attachments, and that the proper view of ourselves is relational-that is it is through our relations with each other that we realize who we are supposed to be.
In the following, I will seek to explicate Gandhi's basis for thinking that both views are correct as well as indispensable for developing a correct political system. By doing so, I will show the relevance and implications Gandhi's understandings have for modern-day debates among liberal and communitarian political theorists. My aim is to show that both perceived communitarian and
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liberal notions are crucial to Gandhian thought and are combined in a way indicative of Gandhi's overall unique political philosophy. Thus, I will try to add greater substance to the "reformed liberal" label Gier gives Gandhi while discussing more of the Mahatma's overall philosophical commitments-in particular, his avowed identification with classic Hindu philosophy. Unlike Gier, I think there is ample room in Hindu philosophical tradition to make sense of Gandhi as a reformed liberal. This follows given the central traditional Hindu emphasis on a Universal Self. A Self, in other words, all should realize that is continuous with all. At the conclusion of this paper, I will explore possible takeaways Gandhi offers for us in our dealings with tensions that stem from differences between liberal and communitarian understandings.
II. A Consideration of Key Conceptual Matters
Before I proceed with my specific arguments and elaborations, it is worth addressing problems that may result from different conceptual understandings of central terms and issues put forth. I do not wish to imply that it is either the Western liberal tradition or pre-modern communal understandings that are responsible for the distinctive Gandhian conception of the self crucial to my arguments. Furthermore, I understand that more than one interpretation of Gandhi's views on religious conversion and caste has emerged from the vast corpus of his writings. I am convinced that my arguments however do not require much by way of specific commitments on such matters but rather rely on essential and key components of Gandhi's discussions of them. It is implications of these parts of Gandhi's views that I hold are of great value in dealing with present day conflicts stemming from differences between liberal and communitarian understandings. Whether I succeed will be left to the reader.
III. Liberal and Communitarian Disputes: A General Overview
The tensions between liberal and communitarian perspectives on the right society are quite familiar and seemingly incommensurable. Since the early 1980s, debates between so-called Rawlsian neo-Kantian "individualists" and Hegelian inspired "communitarians", like Michael Sandel, have maintained a prominent place in Western political philosophy. These debates have involved methodological and normative questions concerning such issues as how the self comes into being (or
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Journal of East-West Thought how our identities are formed). and what the basis is for forming a genuine community. Different philosophical views on these types of issues are manifest in contemporary disagreements (both within and outside of academic philosophy) that relate to the viability of expecting universal adherence to a given code of human rights, and the appropriateness of the state advancing particular notions of the good. Thus, for example, even though it is widely agreed in Western societies that all children have an equal right to an education, arguments over whether parents should be allowed to have their children taught only in the family's native tongue and traditions necessarily involve different understandings on the importance of shared cultural identity and group pluralism. These, in turn, are matters that relate to ontological questions of how a self comes into being and what the necessary limits are to forming genuine community. Different metaphysical assumptions of the self often lie at the heart of such discords. It has been well noted that liberal perspectives, with their talk of equality, freedom, and rights, are predicated on a conception of an individualized, separate, and atomistic self. Communitarian thinkers, in contrast, have emphasized a self that grows in relation to others within a community and forms an identity only as part of a larger group. Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit write: "Both communitarian and individualist theories begin with the image of the individual. But the former claims that there are social attachments which determine the self, and thus individuals are constituted by the community of which they are a part. In that sense the individualist image of the self is ontologically false…."
Sandel's notion of the individualist "unencumbered self" serves to advocate this argument. Sandel postulates the image of a person with "constitutive ends", those ends which constitute who the person is. We must consider people's aims and values if we want to understand who they are. We cannot analyze their behavior as if they were abstract entities, as if their values existed somewhere in the distance, "outside", so to speak. This is a critique of the image of the person put forward by the individualists, who tend to distinguish between who one is and the values one has. Thus, while individualists think in terms of the priority of the self over its aims, communitarians regard this distinction and this priority as artificial, even impossible. (Avineri and de-Shalit, 1993: 3) Gandhi's overall thinking as it pertains to matters of community, constitutive ends, and the ontological status of self enables him to harmonize the seemingly incommensurable outlooks of communitarians and individualists in a distinctively promising way. Gandhian thought offers insights by which we can proceed to
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IV. Gandhian Insights at Work
We should consider Gandhi's approach to the conflicts which arose in (and still confront) Indian society involving religious pluralism and the presence of caste structure. To a very significant extent, these conflicts can be seen as real world manifestations of differences between individualist and communitarian presuppositions. Take, for example, conflicts that have arisen from the religious missionary zeal in India to bring locals "to the one truth" which is believed to be needed by all. The attitudes of missionaries in such cases is unmistakably parallel to the much criticized individualist mind-set that one set of codes should command the agreement and assent of all people given a supposed universal human nature. Additionally, the stratification by caste which has characterized Indian society has helped make that society clearly embody the communitarian's point that the groups we belong to (which determine our social attachments) are not primarily ones we voluntarily join. Exploring the acceptability of this kind of stratification goes to the core of the communitarian's point of view.
V. Gandhi's Takes on Religious Conversion and Castes
In expounding on the distinction in Gandhian thought between "positive" and "negative" religious conversion, Rajmohan Ramanathapillai gives an illustration of Gandhi's ability to successfully harmonize individualist and communitarian elements. (Ramanathapillai, 2010: 40-49) It should be noted that the criticisms Gandhi levels against those religious missionaries he sees to be engaged in negative proselytization are significantly identical to some of the ones communitarians level against liberal understandings. It is no less notable that the criteria Gandhi uses in determining whether missionary work is "positive" Gandhi's point here contains shades of a modern day criticism of the Enlightenment Project (which is typically seen as a natural outgrowth of individualist political philosophy). Joseph Raz summarizes the point of these critics: "The Enlightenment, they say, has thrown out the baby with the bath water.
In recognizing that morality overcomes people's partiality to themselves, the Enlightenment has-those critics claim-created a monster: a universalized individual who is stripped of everything that makes people human, and is reduced to a sheer abstraction. The Enlightenment project is the morality of this abstract individual, and like abstract individuals, it is barren of any content." (Raz, 2010: 
586)
If we substitute "missionary religion" (the kind Gandhi has in mind) for "Enlightenment" and "religious truth" for "morality" in the above passage, we can see the concerns referred to therein, not only parallel, but are virtually identical to those expressed in Gandhian thought. Assuming that the objectivity of reality means religious claims should have genuine meaning to us, even when they are abstracted from the individual cultures we identify with, seems to leave us with a religion that would be barren of significant content (in most places anyway) while damaging a needed and specific sense of identification.
Gandhi's point here relates to another major criticism he levels against missionary activity that again parallels a qualm expressed by critics of political liberalism. Gandhi is critical of religious conversion bereft of real inner understanding, on the part of converts, of the beliefs and practices that they now profess and have adopted. He states, "Real conversion springs from the heart and at the prompting of God…" (Gandhi, 1961: 75 Similarly, it has been argued that by focusing solely on codes of non-discrimination and equal rights (external, ritualistic aspects) and not emphasizing the development of civic virtues, liberal societies are ultimately unable to realize a real sensitivity to the issues and needs of diverse people. In other words, simply outlawing overt discriminatory practices and ensuring procedural fairness is upheld is insufficient for creating a society in which all feel valued. Raz states, "the precepts of multiculturalism cannot be derived from traditional liberal rights…" (Ibid: 591) It is Gandhi's emphasis, however, on such cherished liberal values as self-autonomy, conforming to an objective understanding of truth, and the equality of all that enables him to see some religious conversions as positive. Ramanathapillai writes further: "Positive conversion for Gandhi is self-realization, which requires individuals to examine themselves and spiritually mature without external impediments or interventions.
Positive conversions are nonviolent conversions in which prospective converts enjoy the religious autonomy to choose a right spiritual path that is suitable to their nature. Gandhi argues that positive conversion, nurtured by true religious free will does not thrive because of contact through duress; or because of (the) colonizer's religion policies; or because people are manipulated and mislead…Gandhi is unyielding on this subject that spiritual discoveries are personal…." (Ibid: 45) Additionally, Gandhi's emphasis on a realist conception of truth as well as on equality allows him to accept some religious conversions. Gandhi holds that all of our activities should aim toward realizing Truth. This follows from his belief in a Universal Self (which is equivalent to Truth) whose actualization is life's purpose.
Also Gandhi believes that we are all duty bound to practice nonviolence, and that only nonviolence can lead us to Truth. Furthermore, for Gandhi Truth can only be fully realized in a way that is both non-coercive and collective 14 . Thus realizing Truth can be seen as both our shared final end and a goal which necessitates individual autonomy. Indeed it seems clear that Gandhi would say all of us are actually striving for Truth in our varied actions regardless of how aware we may be of this goal. He states, "As a matter of fact we are all…seeking to know the Unknown." (Gandhi, 1955, 12) 
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The four Varnas have been compared to the four members of the body. If they are members of one body, how can one be superior or inferior to another?
(Our) body politic, the body of humanity, would go to pieces, if it were to perpetuate the canker of superiority or inferiority. It is this canker that is at the root of the various ills of our time. It should not be difficult for even the meanest understanding to see that these wars and strife could not be ended except by the observance of the law of Varna. For it ordains that everyone shall fulfill the law of one's being by doing in a spirit of service that to which one is born. (Ibid: 40)
It should not go unnoticed that Gandhi bases the value of equality in his argument above on an understanding of the community as an ontologically basic and whole unit (like an individual body). It additionally bears mentioning that in the same booklet in which the above passages are found, Gandhi also states "But this duty of labor cannot be imposed on anybody." (Ibid: 47)This is the case even though (as we will see below) for Gandhi, it seems, unless a person has truly matured enough to realize his/her specific duty of labor (independently from social expectations), it is best for them to follow their ancestral path. Thus, we again see Gandhi's sensitivity to liberal values like freedom from external interferences. Furthermore, if we discount the importance he gives to hereditary in the above passages but interpret his points to mean that all of us are bound by the moral law to do that which we can most uniquely do best for society (however this is determined); then Gandhi's defense of a caste system does not seem so outlandish. Ultimately, he is agreeing with the standard liberal view that the same basic duties are universally binding on us all. It is how we go about performing the duty of service to our community (which no one can escape) that varies given aspects specific to ourselves as individuals.
VI. The Take away for Liberal/ communitarian Debates
At times the above discussion may leave one with the impression that Gandhi, like many of us, is simply trying to have his philosophical cake and eat it too when it comes to what he thinks is correct on specific issues. In other words, he is unable to give up important values that are exclusively prominent in both liberal and communitarian camps and winds up putting forth ideas that cannot stand as a consistent whole. However, if we more closely look at his rationale, in the context of his overall philosophy, for taking the above seemingly at odds positions much insight can be gained for us as we deal with tensions that arise for us that relate to
Journal of East-West Thought
debates between liberals and communitarians. Consider, for instance, Gandhi's reply to a correspondent critical of his "continually harping on conscience." (Gandhi, 1961, 123- I must confess the (correspondent's) charge is not without substance…Every virtue has been known to be abused by the wicked. But we do not on that account do away with virtue. We can but erect safeguards against abuse.
When people cease to think for themselves and have everything regulated for them, it becomes necessary at times to assert the right of individuals to act in defiance of public opinion. When individuals so act, they claim to have acted in obedience to their conscience. I entirely agree with the correspondent that youngsters as a rule must not pretend to have a conscience. It is a quality or state acquired by laborious training. Willfulness is not conscience…. (Gandhi, 1983: 454) The extent to which Gandhi's reply sheds light on his overall philosophy can be gleaned when we consider his words here in conjunction with some of his other beliefs. As Douglas Allen and Glynn Richards (among others) have discussed at great length, Gandhi believes that religion should be a significant part of a child's education and that children should be educated in the traditional language of their given community. (Gandhi, 1961: 262) individuals must first reach a real level of maturity before they can be entrusted with the use of certain central liberal rights and freedoms (like the right of conscience). This conclusion is also implied by Gandhi in regards to the freedom of religion. After all, before conversion can be legitimate for Gandhi the convert must first be ready for it by examining himself and spiritually maturing. Since the rights, freedoms, and values cherished by liberals must first be earned by the individual (in much the same way as Gandhi held India must earn its own independence), the ideal state for Gandhi cannot be one which has the primary role of indiscriminately preserving core liberal freedoms for all. Instead, the state should first focus on developing citizens who can be worthy of such freedoms.
We must become worthy of acquiring liberal rights, freedoms, and values in order to fully gain self-realization. The only way one can become worthy of these rights and freedoms is by first learning the truths emphasized in a way that is specific to traditions of his particular community. All communities, at their core, emphasize some real (yet partial) understandings of Truth. These are the ones any given individual is in the position of grasping the most clearly. It is only after such truths have been adequately absorbed can one go beyond them to more fully pursue self-realization (which requires exercising cherished liberal rights and freedoms). Given these points, we can see that for Gandhi the state must not abandon the furthering of communitarian concepts in favor of rights and freedoms but rather regard doing so as necessary in order for its citizens, and thus by extension the state itself, to truly realize independence (swaraj). It is only once we (as individual members of a society) have this independence can it make sense
Journal of East-West Thought for us to be entrusted with the awesome duties possessing rights entails. Gandhi remarked to the U.N. Committee working to draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "All rights to be deserved and preserved come from duty well done. From this fundamental statement perhaps it is easy enough to define the duties of man and woman and correlate every right to some corresponding duty to be performed. Every other right can be shown to be a usurpation hardly worth fighting for." (Gandhi, 1983: 454) In dealing with such problems, the best I hope to do here is offer a general strategy by which they can be resolved. We should remember that for Gandhi the practice of nonviolence (broadly understood) applies to all and is the only way we can realize Truth (which he sees as everyone's ultimate aim we are entitled to). Gandhi, as I have shown, believes we must first properly mature before we can legitimately receive these. It then seems reasonable to conclude Gandhi draws a distinction between our duty to respect the rights of others (regardless of how worthy they may be of them) and the rights which we can properly demand others recognize in their dealings with us. Such a distinction is clearly in line with the willingness Gandhi says a nonviolent activist (satyagrahi) should have to endure but never inflict suffering. (Gandhi, 2000: 10) Thus, just as Gandhi holds our duty to be nonviolent to others does not mean we have a duty to avoid the violent behavior of others, he would say our duty to respect certain rights of others does not, in itself, mean we are entitled to others respecting those rights when interacting with us.
Conclusion
We can see that for Gandhi the true shortcoming of the liberal enterprise has been its failure to help instill in citizens a basis by which liberal rights, freedoms, and values can be understood and thus accepted. Such a basis can only come from understanding ethical duties which make sense to us as members of particular communities. Ultimately, for Gandhi, value neutrality cannot extend to the foundations that underlie the rights, freedoms, and values on which a society is created. This follows since the means for grasping these foundations will remain necessarily varied.
